I’m fascinated by economic bubbles, probably because of my inherent contrarian personality and my hobby as a smug armchair economic quarterback. Everyone who reads this has been at least through two of them. Because of that, we’re all a bit wary of when and where the next one will pop, the same way that Japanese can feel very small aftershocks now. Personally, my money is (not) on China, and I think that this is patient zero: the high speed rail system. The China Railway ministry has 1.8T yuan in debt (about $285B). That’s a lot of red ink. The head minister reassures everyone that this is against assets of 3.3T yuan ($505B) so the overall debt-to-asset ratio is a “manageable” 56%, and may rise to 65%.
There are at least two assumptions in that statement, however:
- The assets are truly worth 3.3T yuan (they’re only worth that much in a bubble economy, true value is likely lower)
- A debt ratio of 60% is sustainable against the cash flow income of the trains (prices are very high, and are easily undermined by bus traffic, or could collapse when demand drops if/when the bubble collapses)
The other day, my friend asked me what is up with “the ChiComs”. First of all, I haven’t heard that term since I was doing government work 12 years ago; second of all, there is nothing communist about the Chinese government aside from the name of the party and that big picture of Chairman Mao downtown. They’re trying to run an economy, just like everyone else. China has a big problem on its hands: it has waaay too much foreign currency holdings in the banks. All of those investments that every US/Japanese/European company has made in China has brought in a big boatload of cash, but all of that money is dwarfed by the mega-craploads (a technical term) of money coming in from sales of all those Chinese manufactured goods (several of which are on your body at this very moment). So, what to do with all that money? Build. Build as much as you can for as long as you can.
Building brings several advantages:
- Construction means infrastructure, which should aid the long-term growth and sustainability (economically, not environmentally)
- Construction means housing, which anticipates the ever growing wave of urbanization. A lot of people are not worried about the ghost cities and empty shopping malls of China, thinking that the people will eventually come in. They’re wrong, I think. People will eventually come in, yes– but only after that bubble pops, and apartments go from US$150K down to $30K (about 3x the average worker’s income).
- Construction means circulating all of that money in a fairly wide swath– paying all those construction workers, material providers, raw materials, etc. In a way, this is probably one of the best things you could do with that money in a command-driven economy. Bush tried something similar to get the US out of the 2001 drop. We know where that one went…
- Construction keeps everyone busy and employed.
Aha! The driving purpose of all of this: keep people working, which means they’re not sitting around thinking up protest slogans or painting protest banners or marching downtown holding those protest banners and chanting those protest slogans. If anything, the PRC fears mass demonstrations the most. If anything, they know this bubble will pop, so they’re consciously trying to spread the wealth around as much as they can before it does. If they get a little infra out of it, all the better.
Which brings us back to our high speed rail friends. When everyone read how much track the Chinese Rail Ministry was building each year, they reacted one of two ways: (a) wow! That’s incredible– why can’t we build that much rail that quickly here? or (b) Something’s wrong– it’s impossible to finance/build that much rail that quickly. Personally, I have been in both columns: I’m a big big fan of high speed rail because I’ve personally experienced the convenience and speed of it, and I’m also an inherent skeptic. The Japanese, ever watchful of their larger neighbor and with a particular eye out for any corner-cutting (driven by overall caution but also some schadenfreude) , have always clearly been in the second camp: the Chinese Rail Ministry must be corner-cutting and fibbing on the books. They should know.
As it turns out, both look to be true: the Chinese Rail Ministry has been cutting corners on the quality of cement, which means slower trains and infrastructure lifespans of 10 years instead of 30, and they’ve been fibbing on the books. This is all being aired out, slowly and cautiously. After all, if those $285B in loans go sour, it could be the pin that pops the whole thing.











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